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This discussion paper presents a microsimulation model of household distress. We 
use logit analysis to estimate the extent to which a household’s risk of being 
financially distressed depends on net income after tax and loan servicing costs. 
The impact of assumed macroeconomic shocks on this net income concept is 
calculated at the household level. The microsimulation model is used to simulate 
both the number of distressed households and their aggregate debt in various 
macroeconomic scenarios. The simulations indicate that household credit risks to 
banks are relatively well contained. 
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estimointeja ja simulointeja mikroaineistolla 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 5/2007 
Risto Herrala – Karlo Kauko 




Tässä keskustelualoitteessa esitetään mikrosimulaatiomalli kotitalouksien riskistä 
joutua taloudellisiin vaikeuksiin. Logit-malleilla estimoidaan, kuinka kotitalouden 
riski joutua taloudellisiin vaikeuksiin riippuu verojen ja lainanhoitokulujen jälkei-
sistä nettotuloista. Oletettujen makrotaloudellisten sokkien vaikutus tähän netto-
tulokäsitteeseen on laskettu kotitalouksittain. Mikrosimulaatiomallilla simuloi-
daan sekä vaikeuksissa olevien kotitalouksien lukumäärää että niiden yhteen-
laskettua velkamäärää erilaisissa makrotaloudellisissa skenaarioissa. Kotitaloudet 
eivät vaikuta pankkien kannalta merkittävältä luottotappioriskin lähteeltä. 
 
Avainsanat: rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakaus, velkaantuminen, mirkosimulaatiot, 
kotitaloudet 
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We construct a micro simulation model which uses as an input the 
macroeconomic forecast of the Bank of Finland and a micro data set of 
households, and produces as an output a forecast of distress in the household 
sector. The study contributes to the growing empirical literature on the 
determinants of household distress. The analysis is also relevant for understanding 
the issue of whether bank loan losses and, in the extreme case, banking crises, can 
be predicted. 
  Traditionally, these issues have been analysed from aggregated (macro level) 
data. While such studies yield relevant insight, they are incomplete because 
aggregation hides distributions. In many fields of study, the representative agent 
point of view inherent in aggregated data suffices for analytical purposes, but in 
the field of financial fragility this may not be the case. One indication of this is 
that in theoretical models of financial fragility, equilibria usually depend on the 
joint distribution of liquidity and shocks in the underlying population. The 
benefits of working with micro level data readily present themselves to the 
empirical economist, who can match budget constraints, debts, and collateral at 
household level to study financial fragility. 
  The following section reviews the previous literature on household debt 
formation and distress. It is observed that there is a young and growing empirical 
literature on the use of micro data sets to model the link between macroeconomic 
developments and household distress. Much of the work, like the present paper, is 
driven by the interests of central banks to study and promote financial stability. 
Especially the work of May and Tudela (2005), and Del-Rio and Young (2005b) 
are important starting points for our efforts. 
  In section 3, we outline a theoretical model of household distress based on the 
household budget constraint: distressed households are those whose consumable 
income is ‘too low’. Our approach can be seen as a variant of Del-Rio and Young 
(2005b). We reformulate their model by taking into account loan instalments and 
the ability of households to sustain consumption by running down assets and 
incurring debt. Our model leads to the conclusion that the probability of 
household distress depends on a set of macroeconomic factors such as interest 
rates and income (as in Del-Rio and Young), and also the collateral value of 
wealth. Our formulation in particular illustrates that not all relevant variables are 
observable, and we discuss a set of assumptions under which we can formulate an 
estimable econometric equation on the macroeconomic determinants of household 
distress. 
  Section 4 reviews the micro data set, which consists of a sequence of annual 
household surveys (‘the service data on income distribution’) conducted by 
Statistics Finland. The surveys give information about some ten thousand  
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households. For the purposes of this study, we can use the surveys from 1999 
onwards. A preliminary look at the data gives support for the idea that the 
relationship between household budgets and household distress accords 
qualitatively with the theoretical model outlined in section 3. 
  Section 5 presents the econometric model used for quantifying the link 
between household budgets and household distress. We analyse the parameter 
estimates, in sample fit and forecast performance of a number of empirical models 
that are consistent with our theoretical approach. In the end, the model with the 
best forecast performance is chosen for simulations. 
  Section 6 introduces the simulator. In the simulator, macroeconomic 
developments affect the budgets of individual households in a mechanical way. 
The econometric model with the best forecast performance is used to calculate the 
forecasts for the proportion of distressed households, debt at risk, and uncovered 
credit risk in different macroeconomic scenarios. The simulator can be calibrated 
to produce a rough forecast on loan losses. 
  Section 7 reports a number of simulations. In the first simulation, a scenario 
made by the Bank of Finland macroeconomic model is utilised to produce a 
projection of household distress under a relatively mild depression. In the second 
simulation, macroeconomic data from the period of the Finnish banking crisis in 
the early 1990’s is utilised to simulate distress in an extreme depression. Finally, 
the section reports simulations on the direct, ‘ceteris paribus’ effect of shocks in 
the different macroeconomic variables (keeping other variables constant). 
Interestingly, it is found that household distress is, ceteris paribus, particularly 
sensitive to changes in interest rates. 




2 Previous  literature
1 
2.1 General  observations 
Micro level data on household debt seem to be available in many countries, 
including at least Finland, UK, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Norway, 
Sweden, US, Australia, Germany, Belgium, Thailand and Philippines. However, 
relatively few articles on household debt have been published in refereed journals 
in the last few years. Instead, most reports fall within the category of ‘grey 
literature’. This applies especially well to contributions that consider indebtedness 
                                                 
1 We thank Katja Taipalus from the Bank of Finland for her contribution to this section of the 
paper.  
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as a problem. It seems to be particularly difficult to find simulation based analyses 
on household debt. Instead, descriptive analyses seem to be more commonplace. 
  There are a few theoretical contributions on household debt. The permanent-
income hypothesis, presented by Milton Friedman in 1957, states that people base 
consumption on what they consider their ‘normal’ income even though their 
incomes may vary considerably in the short term. This may create occasional 
needs to incur debt. The life cycle approach is somewhat similar to the permanent 
income hypothesis, but it emphasises the impact of changes in wealth on 
consumption. Neither of these approaches focuses on problems related to 
indebtedness. 
  This paper focuses on potential problems caused by household indebtedness. 
Hence, it is of particular interest to take a look at previous analyses on difficulties 
in debt servicing (section 2.2). However, section 2.3 contains also al brief survey 
of recent work on the related issue of the determinants of the quantity of debt. 
 
 
2.2  Indebtedness as a problem 
Unfortunately, there seem to be hardly any theorising on household indebtedness 
as a problem. Instead, there are numerous empirical analyses on households’ debt 
servicing difficulties. 
  May and Tudela (2005) used British data to study which factors determined 
the likelihood of having debt servicing difficulties. Unemployment, high levels of 
indebtedness and a high proportion of non-collateralised debt increased the 
likelihood of problems. Difficulties seemed to be of permanent nature; past 
problems were a good predictor of future problems. There was almost no evidence 
of housing wealth preventing difficulties. This might be due to the possibility that 
many interviewees considered themselves to be in difficulties if the time schedule 
of repayments had been renegotiated with the bank. A typical household is 
certainly unwilling to sell the dwelling in order to service loans. Hence, the 
availability of collateral is of limited use in preventing reported difficulties, even 
though collateral certainly reduces banks’ credit risks. 
  May and Tudela introduce a new concept, namely ‘debt-at-risk’, an indicator 
of credit risk. It is simply the sum of household level housing debt multiplied by 
the household level likelihood of financial distress. If it is possible to identify the 
determinants of the likelihood of distress, and if micro level data are available, it 
is possible to calculate the aggregate amount of ‘debt at risk’ and how it would 
react to changes in the parameters, such as interest rates. The sections 6 and 7 of 
this paper apply this concept. 
  Quercia, McCarthy and Stegman (1995) studied mortgage default rates in 
rural areas and among low-income workers in the US. Some of their results were  
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not consistent with previous findings; interest rate subsidies prevented problems, 
but there was no evidence of the relevance of the loan-to-value ratio as a 
determinant of mortgage default. 
  La Cava and Simon (2003) analysed indebtedness among Australian 
households and the risks of rapidly increasing debt. The study was based on 1998 
and 1999 household data. Several factors contributed to a low default risk, 
including owner-occupied housing, advanced age and high income. It seemed that 
couples were less likely to have problems than single persons. If, instead, there 
were several unemployed family members, the household received income 
subsidies or if it had incurred a substantial amount of debt relative to its income, 
or if interest was paid on a credit card balance, problems were more likely to 
occur. 
  Liu and Lee (1997) used various methods to study the determinants of 
housing loan defaults in Taiwan. Several factors, including the loan-to-value ratio 
and the level of education, seemed to contribute to the occurrence of problems. 
Problems were particularly commonplace among the youngest. 
  Bowie-Cairns and Pryce (2005) found with British data that household debt 
servicing ability was an increasing function in the level of education, age and 
marital status. Families with many children were more likely to have problems. 
Geographic factors seemed to play some role. As to loans with no collateral, Del-
Rio and Young (2005b) concluded that high levels of debt and factors related to 
marital status and ethnicity were relevant to the occurrence of problems among 
British households. 
  De Doncker (2006) analysed person related factors correlating with credit 
defaults. The data were extremely comprehensive; in principle, all the mortgage 
and consumer loans granted to individuals in Belgium were included. The credit 
risk of consumer loans appeared to be higher than the credit risk of housing loans. 
The risk of loans granted to a male person seemed to be particularly high. Loans 
with two debtors of different sexes seem to bear a particularly low risk. 
  There are some macro level studies on the determinants of mortgage defaults. 
Brookes, Dicks and Pradhan (1994) analysed British aggregate data. Surprisingly, 
household income seemed to be of limited importance in explaining difficulties in 
debt servicing. Elmer and Seelig (1998) studied the incentives of households to 
default on mortgages in the US. The ‘strategic option’ seemed to be the wrong 
way to explain defaults. Instead, defaults were typically caused by inability to 
service debt. The default risk was higher if there were negative shocks in real 
estate prices and household income. Instead, perhaps surprisingly, interest rate 
variations seemed to be of almost no importance. 
  Barrel & Davis (2004) have presented estimation results on the impact of 
banking and currency crises on consumption. The macroeconomic costs of crises 
tend to be higher if households are more dependent on debt. 
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2.3  The quantity of debt 
There are a lot of descriptive and exploratory studies on the determinants of 
household debt in different countries. These papers do not form clearly 
identifiable schools that would be based on established theoretical approaches. 
Nevertheless, there seem to be some empirical regularities that have been 
corroborated by observations made in many different countries. 
  Del-Rio and Young (2005a) concluded that non-collateralised loans in Britain 
were typically taken by people who were in their twenties, had no children, were 
relatively well educated, were employed and had optimistic expectations. Cox, 
Whitley and Brierley (2002) studied the development of collateralised and non-
collateralised debt at the household level. Brown, Garino, Taylor and Price (2003) 
found that optimism seemed to strengthen the demand for non-collateralised 
loans, even though after a certain level the degree of optimism had no impact. 
Factors such as spouse income and savings seemed to have no impact. 
  Martins and Villanueva (2003) studied the impact of interest-rate subsidies on 
long-term household debt in Portugal. Riiser and Vatne (2006) presented 
observations on Norwegian data from 1986–2003. Household debt had been on 
increase, especially among the youngest households and those with low income. 
The growth of financial wealth had taken place above all in households with no 
debt. Magri (2002) studied the occurrence of debt among Italian households. 
Higher income strengthen both the demand for loans and the availability of credit, 
whereas being an entrepreneur strengthened the demand for credit but made it 
more difficult to obtain loans. 
  Brown and Taylor (2005) studied the determination of household financial 
wealth and debt in the UK, Germany and the US. There was a clear correlation 
between financial wealth and debt. If households with no debt were excluded, the 
correlation vanished. 
  Tudela and Young (2005) analysed the determinants of household balance 
sheets in the UK, applying the hypothesis that households optimise their income 
and consumption over the life cycle. Crook (2001) analysed the 1995 US Survey 
of Consumer Finances data; the demand for household loans seemed to be an 
increasing function in income and family size. 
  Davydoff and Naacke (2005) presented a purely descriptive report on the 
distribution of housing and consumer loans in France, Britain, Germany and Italy. 
Housing loans were particularly commonplace in the UK but remarkably 
exceptional in Italy, even though owner-occupied housing is particularly 
commonplace in Italy. In all the countries the determinants of indebtedness were 
rather similar. 
  The availability of loans can also be a major determinant of household debt. 
Not every household can always get a loan, and problems related to credit  
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availability have been analysed by numerous studies. This literature has a close 
connection with an established theoretical discourse, namely life cycle studies and 
the Euler equation. If credit is not available, households may need to temporarily 
spend less than what optimal consumption smoothing would require. Credit 
constraints may be one of the main reasons why private consumption reacts to 
transitory income stronger than what the Euler equation approach would suggest. 
Most of this literature was published more than ten years ago; in many cases the 
data are from the US of the 1980s. (See Jappelli, 1990; and Cox and Jappelli, 
1993). Ethnicity seems to be related to credit constraints (Duca and Rosenthal, 
1993). Credit availability is particularly problematic if financial markets are 
regulated; credit constraints had a significant effect on the demand for motor 
vehicles before financial liberalisation (Alessie, Devereux and Weber, 1997). 
 
 
3 The  model 
To model the relationship between macroeconomic developments and household 
distress, we use a variant of the approach by Del-Rio and Young (2005b). Their 
model of household distress is based on a household budget constraint: distressed 
household are those, whose surplus (which in their case is income diluted by 
interest payments on debt) falls below a certain threshold, the ‘comfortable’ level 
of consumption of the household. Del-Rio and Young show that, from this 
definition, it follows that household distress depends on the level of interest rate, 
the level of debt, the level of income, and certain other characteristics which 
affect the ‘comfortable’ level of consumption of the household. 
  In our formulation, we use t to index time, i to index household, Y to denote 
household disposable income, D to denote debt, r to denote the rate of interest on 
loans, and s to denote the loan instalment that the household is committed to. 
Household surplus SRPLS is defined 
 
() i . 1 t t t i , t i , t D s r Y SRPLS − + − ≡  (3.1) 
 
Denote by  t , i C M  the minimum level of consumption that a household is 
‘comfortable with’ at period t and by  i , t D  the pledgeable amount of wealth.
2 
Household distress, DSTRS, is then defined 
 
                                                 
2 Pledgeable wealth includes both assets that can be used directly to finance consumption (deposits 
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Under (3.2), a household is distressed if its surplus (income diluted by debt 
service payments) incremented by the possibility to incur new debt, is ‘small 
enough’. Our definition of distress deviates from the definition used by Del-Rio 
and Young in two respects. Firstly, our formulation allows the households’ prior 
commitment to make loan instalments to affect surplus and thus be a potential 
cause for distress. Secondly, our formulation underlines the fact that distress may 
depend on pledgeable wealth  i , t D . Both empirically and theoretically, it is 
difficult to justify ruling out the possibility that households can sustain 
consumption temporarily by taking more debt or running down their stock of 
liquid assets. 
  Below, we use a micro data set to construct proxies for DSTRS and SRPLS at 
household level. The variables  i , t C M  and  i , t D , however, are not observable, and 
one has to make further assumptions to arrive at estimable relationship 
 
1) As  regards  i , t C M , the level of consumption that the household is comfortable 
with, this is bound to depend on a number of idiosyncratic factors such as 
tastes, the local price level, health, family type, etc. Assume, for now, that 
i , t C M  is independent, and log-normally distributed across households with 
mean  c m . (The mean  c m  becomes the ‘constant term’ in estimations, while 
the assumption about its logistic distribution enables the use of logit analysis 
for subsequent estimations). 
2) As  regards  i , t D , a standard assumption in economic models is that households 
can borrow against some fixed proportion of their net wealth. Denote by  i , t W 
the expected value of household tangible and nontangible net wealth at t, and 
by d the pledgeable proportion of this value. Define 
 
i , t i , t W d D ≡  (3.3) 
 
Under assumptions given in 1) and 2), the probability of distress of a household is 
 
() ) W d SRPLS c m ( Pl 1 DSTR Pr i , t i , t i , t − − = =  (3.4) 
 
If surplus and wealth were observable at household level, the unobservable 
parameters in (3.4) could be estimated by logit. If forecasts of household level 
surplus and wealth were available, one could then utilise the estimated model to 
make forecasts about the number of distressed households in the economy.  
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  However, estimates of household wealth are not included in the data set used 
in this study. In practice, estimation of wealth is problematic at best, especially 
when it comes to the net present value of both tangible and human wealth, defined 
as the discounted value of future wage income, which is the relevant wealth 
concept under an inter-temporal budget constraint. In practice, one has to work 
with equations of the type 
 
( ) ) other * 2 SRPLS * 1 0 ( Pl 1 DSTR Pr i , t i , t β + β + β = =  (3.5) 
 
where β are parameters and ‘other’ refers to a vector of potentially useful control 
variables that are included in the data set (to be introduced below). Theoretical 




4 The  data 
The data, Tulonjaon palveluaineisto (the service data on income distribution), is 
from Statistics Finland. The sample, which is collected annually by survey and 
appended from various registers, covers information about the socioeconomic 
status, income and debt of 27 000–30 000 persons (depending on the year), or 
11 000–13 000 families, of which roughly a half have debt. 
  As we are here interested in the mapping between macroeconomic 
developments and loan defaults, the indebted family is the relevant unit of study.
4 
For modelling purposes, it is useful to have information about the family for both 
the current and the previous year. Each family participates in two consecutive 
surveys so that there are about 3  000 such families in the sample of each 
observation year. 
  Since the late 1990’s, the sample variables have included various indicators of 
economic distress 
 
a)  a subjective opinion about whether the household debt level has risen above 
sustainability (four classes: yes; no; does not want to say; cannot say), 
                                                 
3 The estimated parameter of SRPLS does not need to be negative unity because scaling of the 
variables is arbitrary in (3.4): as long as the estimated parameter is negative, rescaling of SRPLS 
and the other variables by the absolute value of β1 gives (3.4). 
4 Use of the family as the relevant unit is necessitated by the data (certain key variables only refer 
to families). From a legal perspective, a debt contract usually binds individuals, not households, 
and wealth and income is by law individual in a marriage. However, as many loans (such as 
housing loans) are typically taken jointly by family members, family assets are typically used as 
collateral for loans, and as spouses typically do choose to assist each other in debt repayment and 
have a joint family budgets, the family may for most purposes be the relevant unit of study.  
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b)  is the household’s property being collected by distraint (yes; no; does not 
want to say; cannot say), 
c)  a subjective opinion about whether the household has had difficulty with 
paying bills or making payments during the ongoing year (very often; often; 
sometimes; once; never; does not want to say; cannot say). 
d)  a subjective opinion about whether the household has had difficulties in 
servicing loans (Once, more often than once, never, unable to say, unwilling 
to say). 
 
After various trials, the approach chosen was to derive from the variables a), b) c) 
and d) one binary indicator of economic distress (DSTRS). The binary indicator 
variable DSTRS gets value 1 if the household either signalled an unsustainable 
debt level, or the household property was under collection by distraint, or the 
person had very often or often difficulty with paying bills or making payments or 
has at least once had difficulties in servicing loans during the survey year. 
  The variable SRPLS (surplus) is constructed by diluting from household 
disposable money income (after tax) their estimated annual debt service 
payments: interest payments and instalments of housing and student loans plus 
estimated interest payments on other loans. The variable SRPLS/C is surplus per 
the number of consumption units in the family.
5 
  Table 1 shows the means of the variables DSTRS, SRPLS and SRPLS/C in 
five consecutive samples 2000–2004. It is observed that the average share of 
distressed households varied between 13 %–19 % in the samples. To interpret, 
this is the proportion of indebted households that show even mild distress in the 
survey. Experiments with narrower measures of distress indicate that the 
simulation results appear to be qualitatively very robust to alternative definitions 
of distress. 
  The table also indicates that the average amount of surplus varied between 
25 000 € and 30 000 € per household, and 15 000 € and 19 000 € per household 
consumption unit. It appears that the average proportion of distressed households 
was lower in the more recent samples compared to the earlier ones. At the same 
time the amount of surplus income available for each household for each 
household consumption unit increased. 
 
                                                 
5 Income and loan service payments are available in the data except that the average interest rate of 
other loans has been estimated by applying average interest rate of other household loans (from the 
Bank of Finland interest rate statistics) to the stock of other credit of the household during the 
previous year. The number of consumption units in a family has been measured by the modified 
OECD scale. An alternative measure of surplus, the debt service ratio, has at best a very weak 
explanatory power on distress in our data.  
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Table 1.   Sample means (weighted) of the distress variable 
      and the surplus variables 
 
      Surplus variables = SRPLS and SRPLS/C; C = 
     consumption  units.
6 
 
sample  DSTRS (%)  SRPLS (€)  SRPLS/C (€) 
2000 18.8  25766  15349 
2001 16.3  27526  16573 
2002 16.0  28393  17105 
2003 13.0  29335  18016 
2004 13.6  29849  17946 
 
 
Chart 1 shows the proportion of DSTRS in each decile of SRPLS/C in the five 
samples (households with smallest surplus are in class 1). In all samples, there 
appears to be a general tendency for distress to increase as the surplus decreases.
7 
The fact that a negative relationship exists between distress and surplus in all 
samples already gives some indication that surplus may be a useful indicator of 
household distress. Surplus correlates well with household vulnerability. 
 
Chart 1.   The average of DSTRS in deciles of SRPLS/C 
      in five data samples  
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6 The means are weighted by probability weights given in the original data. 
7 With the debt service ratio, no such relationship exists in the data.  
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5  Selection and estimation of an empirical model 
In addition to the absence of wealth, a major complicating factor in the 
econometric analysis is that the underlying model (3.4) is likely to be time 
dependent. For one thing, the level of minimum consumption  c m  is likely to 
depend on such factors as the general price level and demographics, which are not 
constant in time. Furthermore, the pledgeable proportion of household wealth d 
varies with the credit policy of banks. 
  In principle, such temporal variation can, to some extent, be controlled in 
panels with a sufficiently long time dimension. However, the present data set does 
not allow for a construction of a long panel, as each household only participates in 
two consecutive surveys.
8 
  Promising results have been obtained by working with the ‘mini panels’, each 
consisting of the about 3  000 households that participate in two consecutive 
surveys. From the available surveys, five such mini panels can be constructed at 
present time, the first one consisting of households that participated in the surveys 
of 1999 and 2000, and the latest mini-panel consisting of households that 
participated in the surveys of 2003 and 2004. 
  Table 2 shows the estimated logit -coefficients of four alternative variants of 
the model (3.5) in the five mini-panels. In models 1a and 1b, the surplus variable 
is SRPLS (surplus at household level), and in models 2a and 2b the SRPLS/C 
(surplus at household consumption unit level). 1a and 2a include no other 
explanatory variables, while models 1b and 2b include lagged distress (DSTRS(-
1)) as an additional explanatory variable. Various other variants of equation (3.5) 
have been estimated but are not discussed here. 
 
                                                 
8 One possible approach is to group the data in repeated cross sections to estimate the parameters 
of model (3.5). This approach has not been successful: the estimated relationships have been weak, 
and the estimated coefficients typically had signs that are inconsistent with the theoretical model 
outlined above. Such problems may be due to the loss of information related to grouping, and the 
fact that the time dimension of the data is still relatively short.  
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Table 2.   Logit coefficients in four models estimated 
      from the five ‘mini panels’. 
 
Probability of DSTRS=1 is the endogenous variable. 
 
   2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
Model 1a  constant  -0.41 -0.58 -0.32 -0.70  -0.94 
 SRPLS  -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00004 
Model 1b  constant  -2.0 -1.7 -1.5 -1.9  -2.3 
 SRPLS  -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00002 
 DSTRS(-1)  3.0 2.5 2.6 2.7  2.8 
Model 2a  constant  -0.31 -0.10 0.45 -0.35  -0.67 
 SRPLS/C  -0.00008 -0.00011 -0.00015 -0.00010 -0.00007 
Model 2b  constant  -2.1 -1.3 -0.8 -1.6  -2.2 
 SRPLS/C  -0.00003 -0.00008 -0.00012 -0.00007 -0.00004 
 DSTRS(-1)  3.0 2.4 2.5 2.7  2.7 
 
 
In all estimations reported in table 2, the signs of the estimated parameters 
conform with prior expectations: surplus affects the probability of distress 
negatively, and past distress affects the probability of future distress positively. 
The large estimated coefficient of past distress suggests significant persistence in 
distress, and inclusion of this variable in the model diminishes the estimated effect 
of surplus on distress. 
  The marginal effect of a change in surplus on the probability of distress is in 
general significantly larger in the simpler models 1a and 2a than in the more 
complicated models 1b and 2b (typically by a factor of about 2).
9 In 2004 (as also 
during the previous years), model 2a had the largest marginal effect. By a 
mechanical (ie linear) readjustment of scale we get that, in model 2a with 2004 
coefficients, a 10% increase in the annual surplus per consumption unit from 
17946  € to 19741  € leads to a decrease in the probability of distress of the 
household from 11.8% to 10.4%. 
  We have made some attempt to benchmark our estimated marginal effects 
with previous results obtained with at least roughly comparable Finnish data. In 
particular, Hyytinen et al (2006) study the probability of payment difficulties by 
logit with the 1998 wealth survey. They find that a 10 percentage point increase in 
the ratio of debt service payments to income leads to a 4.3 percentage point 
increase in the probability that a household had difficulties in making payments, 
and a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability that a household has 
                                                 
9 In 2004, the marginal effect of surplus on output was -7.7E-6 model 1a and -3.0E-6 for model 1b, 
and the marginal effect of surplus per consumption unit was -3.7E-6 and -1.5E-6 for models 2a 
and 2b respectively. Marginal effects in models 1a and 1b are larger than in models 2a and 2b, 
because the exogenous variable in the latter models is scaled down by the number of consumption 
units in each household, which was on average 1.8 in 2004. After making a mechanical correction 
of consumption units, the marginal effects of the simpler models 1a and 2a are typically close to 
each other, as are the marginal effects of the more complicated models 1b and 2b.  
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difficulties in servicing debts. According to calculations based on model 2a (with 
2004 coefficients), a 10 percentage point increase in loan service payments leads 
to a 1.8 percentage point increase in the probability of distress (from 11.8% to 
13.6%). While differences in approach significantly complicate the comparisons, 
it appears tentatively that in our estimated models the probability of distress may 
respond more mutedly to changes in household budgets than in the models of 
Hyytinen et al. Further research is needed is needed to explain these differences. 
  The in sample properties of the models given in table 2 have been studied by 
standard statistical tests. All in all, the more complicated models 1b and 2b 
significantly outperform the simpler models 1a and 2a in in-sample tests. The 
pseudo R2 measure varies between 5%–10% for the two variable models 1a and 
2a, and between 20% and 30% for models 1b and 2b. By the ROC curve analysis, 
models 1a and 2a have moderate and the models 1b and 2b good ability to 
distinguish between the different types. Test results indicate that all models may 
suffer from some form of misspecification, which could be the result of omitting 
some relevant variables eg wealth from the model specifications. While the 
apparent problems in model specification are worrying, they do not necessarily 
imply that the models are useless in forecasting. The forecast ability of the models 
remains an empirical issue which can be tested. 
  As the models are used for forecasting and simulation purposes, one could 
argue that the main emphasis in model selection should be placed on the estimated 
model’s forecasting ability. To this end, the ability of the models to forecast the 
average share of distressed households in the sample of next year was tested in 
each mini-panel.
10 This is a joint test of both the statistical model, estimated from 
previous year’s panel, and the procedure for updating the exogenous variables 
used in the statistical model for next year by using aggregate statistics. The test 
was run under a number of updating routines, but differences in the updating of 
the exogenous variables did not affect the ranking of the models in terms of 
forecasting ability. In all cases, the updating procedure relied on available 
information about the development of aggregate income, interest rates and other 
macroeconomic variables. In this sense, the updating procedure used mimics the 
real life simulation environment in which the paths of the exogenous variables are 
updated by using scenarios generated by the Bank of Finland macroeconomic 
model ‘Aino’. 
  The relative ability of the models to forecast average distress is reported in 
table 3.
11 The second column reports the mean square error of the forecast on 
                                                 
10 As data accumulates, one may wish to consider also many-step-ahead forecasts. See Kauppi and 
Saikkonen (2006) for a discussion of many-step-ahead forecast tests in binary response models. 
11 The updates of exogenous variables are made by a simple updating routine in which the growth 
rates of both household income and debt are assumed to be equal to the growth rate of aggregate 
household disposable income and the aggregate household debt stock)  
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average distress probability as an absolute amount, and the third column as a 
percentage of that of the best forecast (marked by 100%). 
 
Table 3.   Mean square forecast error (MSFE) for the 
      alternative models in absolute amount and as % 
      of the best model 
 
 MSFE  MSFE 
(as % of the best 
model) 
model 1a  0.000199  106.9% 
model 1b  0.000269  144.4% 
model 2a  0.000187  100.0% 
model 2b  0.000280  149.9% 
 
 
The table shows that models 1a and 2a (the simpler models) perform much better 
than the more complicated models 1b and 2b in forecasting average distress. In 
our view, the problems model 1b and 2b may reflect the effect of the missing 
wealth variable: lagged distress functions as a proxy for wealth ‘in sample’, but it 
does not develop like wealth out of sample, during the forecast period. 
  Model 2a is the best forecaster and model 1a the second best forecaster of 
average distress probability. It is observed that the more complicated models 1b 
and 2b, which include the lagged distress as an additional regressor, underperform 
the best forecast by a considerable margin (their respective mean square forecast 
errors are 144.9% and 149.9% of the best model). The sources of forecast error of 
the best forecaster (model 2a) are discussed in appendix 1. 
  As a further benchmark of the forecast accuracy, the forecasting error of the 
best model 2a was compared with the forecast error of a random walk forecast, 
that next year’s average distress equals the previous year’s distress. The average 
mean square forecast error of the best model 2a was about 48% of the mechanical, 
random walk, forecast during the period 2000–2004. This exercise shows that the 
econometrically estimated model 2a outperforms the random walk forecast even 
during this period of relatively ‘average’ economic developments during which 
changes in the underlying exogenous variables are relatively small. The advantage 
of model 2a over the random walk forecast is likely to be significantly amplified 
during periods of more dramatic changes in the economy. 
  To summarise, the larger models 1b and 2b have superior in sample 
properties, but the simple models 1a and 2a outperform them in forecasting. 
Model 2a is the best forecaster over all. In analysis of financial stability, one on 
balance rather wants to use a model that exaggerates rather than dampens the 
risks. From this point of view, model 2a which has the largest marginal effects not 
only has the best forecasting record but it is also the safest choice. 
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6  The household distress simulator 
The aim is to simulate the average probability of distress, debt at risk, uncovered 
credit risk, and loan losses in various macroeconomic scenarios. At present, the 
simulations are based on the latest survey of 2004. Consequently, as aggregate 
household debt and incomes have continued to increase fast, this implies that 
2004 data do not correspond well to the current situation. In order to alleviate this 
problem the data were adjusted to better correspond to the situation in December 
2005. These transformations are described in the appendix 2. The transformations 
give us a data set characterised by 2005 levels and 2004 cross-sectional 
distributions of variables. 
  As a first step in each simulation, the exogenous household level variables 
(income, loan rates etc.) are updated in line with the macroeconomic scenario 
used. Then, each household is assigned a probability of being in financial distress 
by using the latest coefficients of the logit equation 2a. The debt at risk of a 
household is the product of the probability of distress and the amount of debt of 
the household. Debt at risk is calculated separately for two types of debts, namely 
housing loans and other debt. To be more precise, the aggregate debt at risk for 
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where DRk is the aggregate debt at risk of type k debt in the economy, j is the 
household number, N is the total number of households in the sample, Mj is the 
sample weight of the household j (total number of households in the economy 
represented by the sample household j), Dk,j is the amount of debt of type k by 
household j, and Zj is determined by the variables and coefficients of the logit 
model. 
  To calculate a proxy for the uncovered credit risk, the negative net housing 
equity of distressed households was calculated. Housing equity is said to be 
negative if the housing loan exceeds the value of the dwelling in the scenario. The 
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where NHE = aggregate negative housing equity, Dj,housing is the stock of housing 
loans of household j and Hj is a proxy of the sales value of the dwelling of the 
household j. If there is no owner-occupied dwelling, this variable equals zero.  
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  Aggregate uncovered credit risk is now defined as the sum of the negative 
housing equity of distressed households and the aggregate debt at risk of loans 
other than housing loans. The impact of different shocks on the aggregate amount 
of uncovered credit risk in the economy was calculated by adjusting the values of 
different income and interest rate expenditure variables at the household level. 
The sample weight, the number of consumption units and the amount of debt 
remain unchanged irrespective of the scenario in all the calculations. 
  Unfortunately there is no information on interest rate pegs at the household 
level in the data. Hence, an assumption on the interest rate peg was made at 
random for each household. It was assumed that all the loans of a household are 
either at variable or at fixed rates. It was assumed that 6% of household loans bear 
fixed rates whereas 94% of them bear variable rates. This assumption is based on 
aggregate level data. An interest rate shock is assumed to affect the debt servicing 
burden proportionately, provided the household has been assigned variable rate 
loans in the calculations. This simplistic approach ignores two factors that might 
be of importance. First, in some cases the debtor can purchase an insurance 
against negative income shocks, such as unemployment. Secondly, the interest 
rate structure of housing loans may be more complicated. For instance, variable 
rate loan contracts may include an interest rate ceiling clause; the rate of interest 
will not exceed a predefined level even if the reference rate does. 
  Interest paid on housing and student loans is tax deductible. If possible, the 
interest expenditure on these loans is deducted from capital income. If there is no 
capital income, the resulting deficit in capital income is tax deductible, implying 
that taxes decline by 28% of the interest expenditure. The upper limit for this tax 
reduction is EUR 1400 a year per adult. This ceiling is EUR 400 higher if the 
debtor has one child, and EUR 800 higher if there are more than one child. The 
simulator takes into account these tax deductions when it calculates the disposable 
income after tax and loan servicing costs (SPRLS). 
  Income taxation is a key factor affecting household disposable income. 
Income tax legislation is complicated, and it would be extremely time consuming 
to enter equations that would calculate the income taxes of each household 
precisely in all the scenarios. A naïve, exploratory method was used to 
approximate the marginal tax rate and to calculate a rough proxy for the change in 
disposable income at the household level in the various scenarios. This method is 
described in the appendix 4. 
  Unfortunately, the likely sales value of households’ dwellings is not included 
in the original data. Hence, a proxy for this highly important variable was 
calculated (see appendix 3). In the various scenarios it is assumed that a price 
shock affects the prices of all the dwellings by the same percentage. 
  Each individual in the sample is assigned an unemployment risk. This risk is 
determined by a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 
and 1. If an increase in unemployment is assumed, the employees with the lowest  
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variable values are assumed to lose their jobs. If, for instance, unemployment 
increases from 9 to 11 per cent, every employee whose unemployment risk 
variable is less than (0.11–0.09)/(1–0.09)  ≈  0.022 is assumed to become 
unemployed. In this case, the income of the household is reduced by the 
difference of the reported individual wage income and the unemployment benefit. 
This approach does not take into account the fact that unemployment risk may 
depend on employee and employer specific factors. There are three different kinds 
of unemployment benefit systems in Finland. These benefits and their inclusion in 




7.1 Macro  scenarios 
7.1.1 The  basic  scenario 
First, the impact of a mild macroeconomic recession is simulated. This basic 
scenario was created with the help of the Bank of Finland macroeconomic model 
Aino. It manifests itself in several ways. The real GDP deviates by 3.9% from the 
BoF baseline forecast published in early 2006, implying a moderate 0.4 per cent 
decline in real GDP. Unemployment is assumed to surge by 3.3 percentage points 
and housing prices to decline by 12%. No interest rate shock is assumed; Euribor 
rates are assumed to evolve according to prevailing market expectations in spring 
2006. Entrepreneur income is assumed to decline by 3.9% in the basic scenario; 
because of the lack of a better estimate, the elasticity of entrepreneur income with 
respect to deviations from the baseline GDP forecast is assumed to be equal to 
one, and to affect all the entrepreneur households by the same percentage. 
 
 
7.1.2 The  extreme  scenario 
Moreover, the impact of a major depression is simulated. In the early 1990s, the 
Finnish economy was hit by an exceptionally deep recesssion. No other developed 
country has experienced such a collapse in economic activity in the post World 
War II era. The impact of this crisis on the banking sector has been described by 
eg Koskenkylä and Vesala (1994). 
  A depression of this kind is highly unlikely, but it may be of interest to make 
some calculations on the impact of a comparable extreme scenario. Historical data 
is used to identify the most extreme four quarter changes in the three key 
variables. The most extreme four quarter drop in housing prices was 19%  
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(Q3/1991-Q3/1992). The highest increase of unemployment was 4.39 percentage 
points. The highest annual increase of the money market rate was 402 basis 
points. Entrepreneur income is assumed to decline by 11.4%, as happened in 
1990–1991. This decline is assumed to affect all the entrepreneur households by 
the same percentage. These shock components are entered simultaneously in the 
simulator. The shocks would be even more extreme if they were based on 
observation periods longer than four quarters. 
  As can be seen in table 2, the coefficients of the logit equation vary over time. 
We tentatively interpret these changes as indicators of banks’ credit policies (see 
appendix 1). During extreme conditions banks’ credit policies might tighten, at 
least in the case of new loans, even though some banks might allow distressed 
customers to postpone amortizations. The extreme scenario was carried out using 
the most extreme coefficient, from the 2002 data, for the variable SRPLS/C. 
 
 
7.1.3 Standardised  shocks 
The scenario analysis does not tell us much about the sensitivities of household 
loan servicing capability to various macroeconomic factors. These sensitivities, 
however, can be essential to our understanding of the potential stability concerns 
related to the rapid growth of household debt during the last few years. The three 
potential shock factors to be analysed are, again, unemployment, housing prices 
and interest rates. 
  Ideally the individual shocks should be somewhat comparable, but what kind 
of an interest rate shock would be comparable to an unemployment shock of, say, 
one percentage point? In order to calibrate these factors some basic descriptive 
statistics are needed. The standard deviations of these variables’ differences were 
calculated using quarterly Finnish data for a 20 years period. As can be seen in 
table 4, in terms of being either extreme or moderate, a 0.6 percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate in one quarter is comparable to a 3.4% decline 
in house prices or a 98 basis point increase in interest rates. In the following, these 
one standard deviation shocks are called standardised. By calculating the impact 
of a standardised shock we can obtain a rough measure of the sensitivity of 
uncovered credit risk with respect to adverse macroeconomic disturbances. 
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Table 4.   Some descriptive statistics on macroeconomic 
     phenomena 
 







(Pt/Pt-1 -1)*100 Ut - Ut-1 Rt - Rt-1
Mean 1.19 0.04 -0.11
Std Dev 3.42 0.59 0.98
Minimum Maximum Maximum
-19.1 % 4.39 4.02
Largest adverse 4 




The simulation results are reported in table 5. In the basic scenario, the total 
amount of problem loans does not change much in the simulation compared to the 
actually observed amount. In fact, the uncovered credit risk levels are in the basic 
scenario surprisingly insensitive to the underlying macroeconomic disturbance. In 
relative terms, the increase of negative housing equity of distressed households 
perhaps stands out as the only interesting exception. If the depression lasts for 
many years, dwelling price declines could cumulate and the total change would be 
stronger. However, the estimated level of negative housing equity in the initial 
situation is probably biased downwards because of the assumption that no 
household living in owner-occupied housing can have a negative housing equity 
before the shock. This makes the percentage increase appear high. Even after this 
shock housing loans would pose no serious threat to the financial system. 
  The extreme scenario gives stronger results. In this case the uncovered credit 
risk would increase by almost EUR 5 billion, when compared to the model-based 
estimate in the absence of shocks. In 2005, operating profits of the Finnish 
banking sector totalled EUR 1.9 billion (FSA 2006). The final sum of banks’ loan 
losses would probably be significantly lower. However, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that under extreme conditions credit risks of household loans alone 
could pose major stability problems, even though this situation is highly unlikely. 
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Table 5.   Simulation results in various scenarios 
 
mill €
% of indebted 
households 
distressed
Loans (excl housing 
loans) of distressed 
households









Add impact on 
negative housing 
equity of distressed 
households




Observed 2005 situation - model 
based 13,9 % 2 572 5 964 426 2 997
Basic scenario 14,1 % 2 616 6 075 635 3 251
Extreme scenario - 2002 
coefficients 20,9 % 5 725 12 410 2 001 7 725
Add. unemployment (+0.59 %)  14,2 % 2 620 6 091 636 3 256 1 4 5
Additional dwelling price shock (-
3.4%) 14,1 % 2 616 6 075 708 3 323 72 0 72
Interest rate shock (+98 basis 
points) 14,3 % 2 727 6 238 658 3 386 23 112 135
1) Negative housing equity of distressed households + non-housing loans of distressed households  
 
 
The next step is to analyse the sensitivity of uncovered credit risk to each of the 
three standardised macroeconomic shocks (see table 4). These standardised 
shocks are added to the basic scenario. As can be seen in the table 5, the 
standardised interest rate shock affects the amount of uncovered credit risk more 
than any of the other shocks. Hence, when one evaluates credit risks of household 
loans, particular attention should be paid to the development of interest rates. On 
the other hand, this result is probably partly due to the observation period. In the 
early 1990s, interest rates were substantially higher and more volatile than what 
they have been in the monetary union. If the standard deviation were estimated 
with more recent data, we would probably have a weaker standardised interest 
rate shock, but the number of observations on the EMU era may be too limited for 
meaningful statistical calculations. 
  The impact of an additional housing price shock would also be of some 
importance, even though its impact is limited to the negative housing equity. If 
housing equity affected the probability of being financially distressed, house price 
shocks would have other effects as well. 
  Perhaps the most interesting finding is the surprisingly weak estimated impact 
of unemployment shocks. This may seem surprising, since one would expect that 
for many households loss of (wage) income due to unemployment presents 
perhaps the most important source of income risk. The result may be due to 
assumptions on unemployment benefits. New housing loans are typically granted 
to persons in full time jobs. In the above calculations, it has been assumed that 
such persons are entitled to the earnings-related allowance; in most cases this 
allowance helps to maintain a satisfactory income level, unless the duration of 




7.3 Robustness  tests 
7.3.1  The unemployment benefit system 
In the above simulations the unemployment shock seems to have only a very 
marginal contribution to the household sector credit risk. We think this result is 
counterintuitive and needs further analysis. More specifically, we think we need 
to check for the role of the unemployment benefit system in explaining this 
outcome. The simulations above assume that all the wage earners who have been 
employed for at least 10 months on a full time basis are entitled to earnings-
related unemployment benefits in the case of unemployment. Is the result robust if 
this assumption is relaxed? Not every employee is member of an unemployment 
insurance fund. The duration of the earnings-related allowance is limited to 500 
working days. Hence, if unemployment worsened permanently, this source of 
household income would gradually diminish. 
  In the following, a more pessimistic scenario is applied. It is assumed that 
none of the employees who lose their jobs in the scenario get more than the labour 
market subsidy, which is much less than the earnings-related benefit (see 
appendix 5). Furthermore this subsidy is conditional on spouse income, making it 
possible for an unemployed worker to end up in a situation where the system 
declares him or her not entitled to any unemployment benefit. This particular 
feature of the unemployment system has also been taken into account in the 
calculations. However, as we can see in table 6, even in this case the impact of an 
additional unemployment shock on the amount of uncovered credit risk remains 
surprisingly weak. It is moreover worth mentioning that these calculations do not 
take into account the likely increase of other transfers from the government, such 
as subsistence grants. 
 
Table 6.   Results if no earnings-related unemployment 
     benefits 
 
Assumption - all the newly 
unemployed will get the 








































Basic scenario  14,3 % 2 640 6 165 647 3 287
Add unemployment shock (+0.59 
%) 14,4 % 2 647 6 190 648 3 295 2 6 8
Basic scenario described in section 7.1.1.  
 
 
Even though this result may seem surprising, it may simply reflect the inadequacy 
of the postulated size of the unemployment shock in the type of exercise we are  
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interested in tables 4 and 5; to generate a sizable adverse income shock to 
household finances through unemployment we probably need a much larger 
increase in the unemployment rate. The results above do suggest that household 
income is quite well insured against relatively small shocks to unemployment. 
 
 
7.3.2  Ability to postpone amortizations 
The simulations assume that households cannot affect the financial burden of loan 
servicing. Both interest payments and amortizations of housing and student loans 
are exogenously given throughout the simulation exercise. Interest rate 
expenditure is likely to be exogenous even in reality. However, it is plausible that 
in practice households are, at least to some extent, able to postpone amortizations. 
In some loans this is an explicit part of the original contract. The monthly loan 
servicing cost may be fixed for the whole loan period, but the quantity of 
amortization depends on the sum of money needed for interest payments. 
  The disposable income variable (SRPLS) was recalculated. It was assumed to 
equal the difference of net income (after tax) and interest rate payments. But 
unlike in the basic model, no amortizations are deducted from SRPLS. As can be 
seen in the table 7, the uncovered credit risk is relatively insensitive to the 
assumption on the possibility to postpone amortizations, as the estimates are only 
slightly lower than in the basic model of section 7.2. 
 
Table 7.   Results if households can postpone amortizations 
 
No compulsory 




















Observed situation - model 
based 12,4 % 2 352 4 723 334 2 686
Basic scenario 12,6 % 2 393 4 812 495 2 888





Our analysis contributes to the literature on household indebtedness, in which 
studies on the determinants of household debt seem to be particularly 
commonplace. In contrast to many of these studies, we focus on loan servicing 
problems and out of sample forecasting and simulation, rather than purely on in-
sample goodness-of-fit of an estimated model for household indebtedness. We use 
the conceptual framework of Del-Rio and Young (2005b). A household is 
financially distressed if its income after tax and loan servicing costs is ‘too low’. 
  Our proxy for financial distress was defined as a simple function of the 
information collected in interviews. The definition for distress used in these 
simulations is relatively broad: a household is classified financially distressed if 
the interviewee reports any problems related to loan servicing or paying bills. The 
number of distressed households declined in 2000–2004, but even in the most 
recent data almost 14% of households still experienced some distress. A number 
of logit models for the probability of a household being finanacially distressed 
were estimated. These estimations tried to measure the dependence of financial 
distress on a relatively limited number of key variables. These models were 
estimated separately using household level data for five consecutive years. 
  We tested whether the estimated model could be useful in forecasting the 
average number of distressed households in the next year’s sample under the 
assumption that an accurate macroeconomic forecast is available. The 
macroeconomic situation facing households at the micro level is generated under 
the assumption that the determinants of distress, such as interest rates, income and 
debt, evolve similarly for all the households. In terms of forecasting performance 
the best model was relatively simple, as it incorporates only one explanatory 
variable, income net of taxes and loan servicing costs per consumption unit. In 
particular, and somewhat surprisingly, our results suggest that past financial 
problems should not prove useful in forecasting financial problems in the 
household sector. Our simple model is shown to significantly outperform the 
competing alternatives, including a mechanical one where the current average 
distress is extrapolated into the next period, during the estimation period. 
  The model with the best forecast performance and the estimated logit 
coefficients were used in a number of simulation exercises concerning changes in 
households’ financial distress to macroeconomic shocks. The 2004 data was 
adjusted to correspond to the situation in 2005. We simulated the effects of shocks 
to unemployment, interest rate and housing prices on the degree of financial 
distress of the household sector. Debt at risk, defined as the total amount of debt 
of distressed households, seems to be surprisingly insensitive to these shocks. 
Shocks to unemployment seem to have only a marginal contribution to debtor 
households’ financial problems. Interest rate shocks have a somewhat stronger  
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impact because most of the household loan stock bears variable interest rates, but 
even this effect is moderate. The main findings corroborate conclusions drawn on 
past experience. In most states of the economy household loans bear a relatively 
low credit risk to banks. However, under extreme conditions with a coincidence of 
large and persistent adverse shocks to unemployment, interest rates and housing 
prices, even household loans could become a threat to financial stability. 
  Our approach is obviously quite simple and straightforward and does not take 
into account all the relevant factors affecting the fragility of household finances. 
For instance, under certain conditions housing loans of young households can be 
offered a partial government guarantee, which reduces banks’ credit risks. 
Moreover, housing loans may be covered by an insurance against unemployment, 
health problems and other negative income shocks, which may also be an efficient 
risk mitigation technique. A useful extension of our approach would thus be to 
control for these in the estimation procedure. 
  Future work aims at developing the model further to increase its forecast 
accuracy. Other explanatory variables for distress could conceivably be found. 
The updating process can be improved. Moreover, the approach is clearly partial. 
It does not take into account indirect effects of household debt on banking crises. 
For instance, domestic industries are likely to suffer if consumers have to cut 
down expenditure, which might lead to bankruptcies and credit losses. Moreover 
the analysis does not fully incorporate the possibility of the coincidence of very 
large shocks to interest rates, unemployment and housing prices, ie of very high 
interest rates, very high unemployment rate and very low housing prices. 
  From the point of view of financial stability, it would be important to carry 
out a companion simulation study of corporate distress. Furthermore, the issue of 
feedback effects of financial instability on the macro economy should be placed 
high on the agenda for future research.  
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Decomposition of forecast error in model 2a 
Chart 2 illustrates the main sources of forecast error for model 2a, which is the 
best forecaster. The left side pillar shows the actual mean forecast error of model 
2a in the whole sample. The centre pillar shows the ‘forecast’ error of this model, 
if the estimated coefficients had corresponded with the true coefficients. This 
component of the error is, therefore, solely caused by the updating procedure 
(used for updating the exogenous variables in the model). The rightmost pillar 
measures the mean forecast error in the hypothetical case when the estimated 
coefficients are correct and the estimates of income developments at the 
household level conform exactly with reality. The mean square error in this case is 
caused solely by the update routine for debt repayments. 
 
Chart 2.   Forecast mean square error of model 2a with 
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It is observed from the chart, that a lion’s share of the forecast error of model 2a is 
caused by changes in the model parameters during the forecast years. If the 
correct model parameters were known at the time when the forecast is made, this 
would reduce the mean square forecast error to close to one third of what it 
currently is. The remaining forecast error is caused by the fact that the forecaster 
does not know the development of income and debt at household level but, rather,  
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uses the aggregate growth rates of household income and debt to update 
household income and debt during the forecast year. A number of attempts were 
made to append the models with additional explanatory variables to improve their 
forecast performance. So far, these attempts have not been successful. It seems 
that, for forecasting purposes, the simplest models work best. 
  It is interesting that parameters of model 2a in fact move in time counter to 
each other. This is illustrated graphically by chart 3, which shows the evolution 
estimates of the constant term and the parameter for surplus in time. In 2002, the 
constant term was relatively small, and the effect of surplus large: during these 
years distress probability appears to have been relatively closely related to the 
economic surplus of the household. In years 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004, on the 
other had, the default probability is less dependent on current surplus. The fact 
that the parameter estimates are ‘mirror images’ of each other may be an indicator 
that there is a single underlying factor that is driving the evolution of the model 
parameters in time. 
 
Chart 3.   Parameters of the model 2a and bank interest 



























The third line in the chart is the margin applied by Finnish banks when granting 
consumption loans. The evolution of this margin is, again, a mirror image of the 
effect of surplus on default probability. It could be, then, that one factor driving 
the instability of the model parameters is the credit policy of banks. During 
periods when banks apply tight margins for consumption credit (years 2000, 2001,  
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2003 and 2004), household distress is relatively less related to household surplus 
that during other periods, because household can balance their budget by 
increasing their borrowing. During periods when bank credit policy tight (2002), 
households found it harder and more expensive to borrow. The probability of 
distress is, subsequently, more related to household surplus income that during 




Updating the data 
The net monetary income of each household was multiplied by 
 
[1.034*Wage income + 1.0037*Income transfers + 1.048*Entrepreneur income + 
0.956 Capital Income ]/[Wage income + Income transfers + Entrepreneur income 
+ Capital income]. 
 
Capital income does not include the imputed rent on dwellings. The multiplier 
1.034 corresponds to the increase of the overall wage level in 2004–2005. The 
multipliers of entrepreneur and capital income correspond to the aggregate growth 
of these income components in 2004–2005. The multiplier 1.0037 corresponds to 
the increase of the KELA index, which should normally correspond to the 
increase in the cost of living; several public sector income transfers are indexed 
on it. The resulting augmented net monetary income is probably a satisfactory 
proxy for the net monetary income in 2005. This approach suffers from the 
problem that it does not take into account the impact of taxation on net income. 
Tax laws are subject to frequent changes, and not every income item is treated 
equally by tax laws. Moreover, income transfers are far from being homogenous, 
and not all of them are indexed. Transfers in the data include voluntary transfers 
between households. 
  On average, these adjustments increased the nominal income by 1.9%. 
  The amount of housing loans was multiplied by 1.167 for each household, 
which corresponds to the growth rate of households’ mortgage loans at the 
aggregate level in 2004–2005.
12 Interest rates paid on housing loans were 
multiplied by 1.115, which corresponds to the growth of the loan stock and the 
decline in the average interest rate level. 
  The amount of student loans was held constant; there has been no clear trend 
in the amount of outstanding student loans. 
  Loans other than student and housing loans were multiplied by 1.113. This 
corresponds to the growth rate of other household loans in 2004–2005. 
  These proxies are certainly biased in a way or another. A major problem may 
be that the concentration of housing loans between households may have changed 
since end 2004. On the other hand, using data for 2004 as such would certainly be 
even more problematic in forward looking analysis. 
                                                 
12 See Bank of Finland Financial Markets Statistical Review, Table 7.4  
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Appendix 3 
Proxies for dwelling prices 
The original data contains no proxy for the price of the dwelling. Instead, there is 
some information on the size, geographic location and type of building. 
  Using data on the geographic location, it is possible to identify dwellings in 
the following cities and towns: Helsinki, the rest of Helsinki metropolitan area, 
Tampere, Turku, Oulu, Porvoo, Kuopio and Jyväskylä. Most of these localities 
were chosen because of the relatively large number of inhabitants. Porvoo, 
however, was chosen because the price level of real estate is clearly higher than in 
other towns of the same size. 
  As to the price of flats and row house apartments, the source of price 
information was Statistics Finland release ‘House Prices’ (8 May 2006). In the 
case of apartments in the above mentioned localities, the proxy for the price for 
each dwelling was calculated by multiplying the size of the dwelling by the 
average price of a square metre. In the case of ‘Helsinki metropolitan area except 
Helsinki’, the price was calculated as the average of prices in Espoo-Kauniainen 
and Vantaa, the price for each locality being weighted by the number of 
inhabitants. As to the rest of Finland, the price EUR 1265 per square meter was 
used. The average price level in the rest of the country must be very close to this 
approximation; otherwise the national average outside the Helsinki metropolitan 
area could not be EUR 1327 reported by Statistics Finland. Again, the number of 
inhabitants was assumed to be the proper weight for each locality. 
  As to one-family detached houses, there is less price information available. 
The calculations are based on Statistics Finland data
13. Average prices per square 
meter are available for Helsinki region (€ 1978/m
2). other cities with more than 
100 000 inhabitants (€ 1790/m
2) and the whole country except Helsinki region 
(€ 1136/m
2). With these data and population statistics it can be calculated that the 
average price in municipalities with less than 100 000 inhabitants must be about 
€ 931 per square meter. 
  In surprisingly many cases the housing loan exceeds the price of the dwelling. 
This is not credible because dwelling prices have been increasing for many years 
and because the loan to value ratio should be less than 100%. There are many 
possible explanations to these cases, and based on the data, one cannot evaluate 
which of them is the typical correct explanation. In some cases the loan has been 
taken to buy a dwelling that has already been sold. It is also possible that some of 
the loans have been taken to buy a dwelling under construction, or still occupied 
by the previous owner. Some households may have several dwellings. Some 
                                                 
13 Release 16 Jun 2006.  
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dwellings may be very expensive relative to other dwellings in the same locality 
because of reasons such as an expensive local district or an exceptionally high 
standard. It was assumed that the housing wealth of no household can be lower 
than the housing loan, provided the household is living in an owner-occupied 




Controlling for non-linear marginal tax rates 
Net income after tax should be a mechanistic and deterministic function of the 
different components of gross income and a few other factors. This relationship, 
however, is complicated because of the complexity of the tax system. Wages and 
capital income are taxed differently. Pensions and unemployment benefits are 
taxable, some other income transfers are not. The marginal tax rate for the wage 
income is higher for high income groups, and the distribution of wage income 
between family members affects the total amount of income taxes; if both spouses 
earn the same salary, the total income tax will be lower than in the case of another 
family with the same total gross income but only one breadwinner. The local tax 
rate varies between municipalities. Members of the two major religious 
communities (Lutheran and Orthodox churches) pay church taxes that depend on 
the locality. There is no special tax rate on entrepreneur income, but the tax 
system divides this source of income into earned and capital income. It might be 
possible to code the whole tax system in the simulator, including all the above 
mentioned details, but this would be extremely time consuming. 
  The second possibility is to use a rough statistical approach; the impact of 
gross income on net income is estimated with a simple statistical method. It would 
be possible to assume that the net disposable income is a linear function of the 
gross income and to run a regression with only one explanatory variable. This 
parsimonious approach would be simple and maybe even elegant, but it would 
make a very poor approximation of reality. 
  A more complicated statistical approach was taken. Different income 
components were tested as explanatory variables and, when appropriate, 
interactions and transformations of these income components were also included 
in the analysis. The data consists of households of the Statistics Finland income 
distribution survey, and the observation unit is a household, not a person. In the 
final specification, statistical significance was a central criterion for the choice of 
variables. Wage income is allowed to affect the net income in a particularly 
complicated way because of three reasons. 
 
–  The income tax system treats earned income in a particularly complicated 
way. 
–  Wages are the most important type of income among debtor households. 
–  Unemployment shocks are a central factor in the various scenarios. 
 
Not much structure is assumed on the final specification. However, the regression 
was run with no constant term. A non-zero constant term in the equation would  
41 
imply that a household can have some net income even if there is no gross 
income, not even transfers from the government. The explaining variables are 
PaTu = gross wage income of the whole household; PaTu2 = PaTu squared; 
PaTu3 = PaTu to the power of three; PaYr = wage income multiplied by 
household entrepreneur income; PaTuKe = wage income multiplied by Σ(wage 
income of the person/wage income of the household)
2; PaTuKe2 = wage income 
multiplied by [Σ(wage income of the person/wage income of the household)
2]
2; 
TuSi = received transfers; OmTu = capital income; YrTu = entrepreneur income; 
YrTu2 = entrepreneur income squared. 
 
Table 8.   The determination of net monetary income 
 
B Std.Err. t(11188) p-level
of B
PaTu 8.1E-01 4.0E-03 205.8 0.000000
Patu2 -1.4E-06 2.5E-08 -57.2 0.000000
Patu3 1.6E-12 3.8E-14 42.2 0.000000
PaYr -1.4E-06 9.4E-08 -15.3 0.000000
PaTuKe2 6.1E-04 1.8E-04 3.4 0.000606
YrTu 7.8E-01 2.9E-03 263.7 0.000000
YrTu2 -3.2E-07 1.4E-08 -22.2 0.000000
TuSi 7.2E-01 2.9E-03 246.8 0.000000
OmTu 6.7E-01 7.4E-04 901.9 0.000000
Patuke -1.0E-01 5.1E-03 -20.1 0.000000
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: Net 
Monetary Income
R= .995 R²= .990 Adjusted R²= .990





This blurred equation should not be considered an analysis of the tax system. Its 
aim is not to test whether certain factors affect the net income or not; we know 
that all of them do. It certainly suffers from various biases, including biases 
caused by omitted variables (such as the wealth tax and real estate tax), and it is 
unable to take into account the marginal tax rate discontinuities in the central 
government income tax. However, this equation is probably relatively useful for 
its intended purpose. This intended purpose is very narrow and specific. The 
equation is aimed at calculating a satisfactory proxy for the marginal tax rate in 
various income intervals. If the wage income of a single person with no other 
income is close to zero, the marginal tax rate is about 19%. If a single person has 
an annual wage income of EUR 30 000, the marginal tax rate would be 37%. If 
the wage income is EUR 80 000, the marginal tax rate is 48%. These marginal tax 
rates are relatively close to the ones implied by state, municipal and church taxes 
in most localities. The marginal tax rate on capital income implied by the equation  
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(32%) is somewhat higher than the actual tax rate (28%), possibly because capital 
income correlated positively with the wealth tax. 
  The equation is aimed at analysing the impact of a decline in one component 
of gross income on net income. The final net income to be used in the various 
scenarios is not the one predicted by this arbitrary statistical model as such. 
Instead, the equation is used only as a method to calculate a proxy for the change 
in the net income at the household level in the various scenarios. If the net income 
predicted by the equation decreases by one euro, it is assumed that the net income 
in the scenario declines by one euro, when compared to the original situation. If 
there is no change in gross income, there is no change in net income either. To be 
more precise 
 
NetInc scenario = NetIncOriginal situation + (NetIncEquation, scenario – NetInc 
Equation, original situation). 
 
In case of unemployment, the unemployment benefit of persons who are assumed 
to lose their jobs is not treated as an income transfer but as wage income. This 
choice is based on the fact that unemployment benefits are treated as earned 
income by the tax law. Because no shocks are assumed to affect capital income 
and transfers, the coefficients of these variables are irrelevant to the final net 
income in the various scenarios. These variables are included in the equation only 
because it may be important to control for them. 
  This equation is not used to calculate the tax deductions of housing and 
student loans in the various scenarios. These deductions are calculated separately 




There are three different statutory unemployment benefits in Finland 
 
– Earnings-related  allowance 
– Basic  allowance 
–  Labour market subsidy 
 
A detailed description of these systems is available on the Social Insurance 
Institution web page (http://www.kela.fi/in/internet/english.nsf/NET/ 
081101150015EH?OpenDocument). The three systems can be briefly summarised 
as follows. 
  The earnings-related allowance is paid if the person is member of an 
unemployment fund and satisfies certain conditions concerning past employment. 
This benefit consists of two components. The daily basic amount is EUR 23.50 
for five days a week. The earnings-related amount equals 45% of the difference 
between the basic amount and previous daily salary. If the monthly salary before 
unemployment exceeded EUR 2115, the earnings-related part is somewhat lower. 
The benefit cannot exceed 90% of the previous salary. Beneficiaries with 
dependent children get additional increases. This benefit is not paid after 500 
working days of unemployment. 
  If the unemployment has lasted for more than 500 working days, or if the 
person does not satisfy the previous employment condition, the labour market 
subsidy can be paid. This benefit equals EUR 23.50 per day for five days a week. 
Beneficiaries with dependent children get additional increases. Spouse income can 
reduce this benefit. 
  If the person is not member of an unemployment fund but satisfies the criteria 
of past employment, the basic allowance can be paid. In many cases the basic 
allowance equals the labour market subsidy. 
  All the benefits are conditional on certain criteria. The applicant must be 
registered as an unemployed person, willing and able to accept employment, be 
between 17 and 64 years of age etc. As of 31 December 2004, there were 138 000 
persons receiving the earnings-related allowance, 143 000 persons receiving the 
labour market subsidy and 22  000 receiving the basic allowance. (See the 
statistical yearbook 2004 of the Social Insurance Institution, p. 227) 
  Because the benefits are determined in a simple and mechanistic way, the 
rules determining the allowances are entered as such in the simulator. There is one 
exception to this, namely the type of benefit to be paid. In the data, there is no 
information on membership in an unemployment fund, implying that one cannot  
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say who would get the earnings-related allowance in case of unemployment. In 
the simulations, it is simplistically assumed that persons who lose their jobs in the 
scenarios will get the earnings-related allowance provided they have been 
employed for at least ten months on a full time basis during the previous year. 
This ten months criterion is a rough approximation of the previous employment 
criterion of the unemployment benefit system. In reality, not all of them would be 
entitled to the earnings-related allowance because not all of them are members of 
an unemployment fund. Those who do not satisfy the condition of ten months of 
previous employment are assumed to be paid the labour market subsidy. 
  The tax system treats unemployment benefits as earned income. Hence, the 
simulator treats unemployment as a reduction in wage income and replaces the 
original wage income with the calculated unemployment benefit to recalculate the 
after tax net income. 
  The simulator is not used to calculate the unemployment benefits of persons 
who were unemployed in the original situation. As to them, the original income 
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